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Excess Words, Surplus Names 






There is little that observers of the contemporary political scene agree 
upon so readily as the need to reinvigorate civic conversations. In a time of 
social division, citizens routinely live in spaces where they interact with those 
who already share their values, and they absorb information streams tailored 
to their existing ideological commitments. As a result, civic debates 
increasingly sidestep meaningful normative exchange, in favor of talking 
points designed to provoke or belittle. To counteract these dynamics of social 
distance, we are often told that conversations need to take place across 
sectarian lines. And from this vantage point, Jacques Rancière and Jürgen 
Habermas are frequently highlighted as uniquely well suited to explore the 
possibilities and difficulties that attend civic conversations. 
Both theorists, after all, identify the production and exchange of speech 
as central to democratic practice. The association of language and citizenship 
has a deep provenance—reflected in a long tradition of thinking the human 
subject as uniquely qualified for politics. The human, in Aristotelian terms, 
possesses language in order to present and negotiate matters of justice.1 And 
both theorists coincide in their suspicions toward features of the late modern 
world that erode possibilities for democratic exchange. From his earliest 
writings, Habermas has criticized a technocratic culture that seizes social 
decisions from citizens and, instead, allows policy choices to devolve to 
experts. Here, a culture of top-down administration, defined by considerations 
of efficiency, increasingly supplants citizen oversight or meaningful 
deliberations over justice.2 Likewise, Rancière has targeted the “post-politics” 
of neoliberal modernity, where the agonistic character of democratic life is 
elided in favor of the “public opinion poll” or the ostensible necessities of 
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economic markets.3 To counteract these tendencies, both theorists highlight 
the politicization of more spheres of life as central to democratic politics, so 
that ever more practices come under collective scrutiny and debate. 
 That said, there is no easy way to reconcile these efforts to understand 
citizenship as a domain of speech. From this broad starting point, Rancière 
and Habermas diverge considerably on what it means to be a speaker and the 
democratic contributions of language. Indeed, the essay will highlight how this 
shared emphasis on speech gives rise to significant divides regarding the 
social ontology of language, the forms of power that attend linguistic 
exchange, and how speech informs democratic agency. Accordingly, the first 
section will stage the dispute between Rancière and Habermas in such a way 
as to bring out their competing phenomenologies of the speech situation. 
Although much commentary rests on this point, the subsequent sections will 
use this disagreement to develop a broader set of reflections on the meaning 
and role of language for a politics of equality. Where Habermas privileges 
discourse as a medium of understanding, Rancière highlights an “excess of 
words” that proves generative for political agency. The divergence leads the 
essay to close on a normatively richer question: how this “excess” of language 
might enable a substantively democratic politics. As the essay will ultimately 
argue, Rancière does not only expose the political deficits in deliberative 
models—in stressing how civic language is litigated and contested, he offers 
productive resources to theorize how democratic publics can be rearticulated 
in more egalitarian directions. 
2. 
As scholars will know, Habermas sought to rescue critical theory from the 
path of the late Frankfurt School. On Habermas’ reading, the canonical figures 
of the Frankfurt School viewed capitalist modernity as a space of nearly 
totalizing control. The effects of power reach into the deepest levels of 
experience, and reason itself has become a tool of domination.4  In response, 
Habermas argues that this pessimism reflects a fundamental misdiagnosis. 
Where earlier generations of critical theory situated reason within the 
instrumental mastery and control of objects, a reinvigorated critique would 
attend to the rational potentials of everyday communication. To compress a 
nuanced story into brief form, communicative reason is based in the linguistic 
negotiations made by speaking agents as they forge or restore the consensus 
upon which social coordination rests. To take communication seriously is to 
access a distinctly intersubjective reason undersold or missed by the core 
figures of the Frankfurt School. And, in a more robust sense, these 
communicative resources ultimately offer a path toward a more fully rational 
society.5   
From this opening follow a number of substantive political conclusions. 
Most broadly, everyday communication does not simply yield another form of 
reason, but one that makes distinct contributions to democratic life. In perhaps 
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the farthest-reaching line of argument, Habermas proposes that a) 
communicative reason offers a noncoercive means to coordinate the complex 
operations of social life; and b) the quasi-transcendental conditions of 
everyday communication yield a standard for rational justification under 
conditions of value pluralism.6 Such gains can first be situated within the 
relational structures of dialogue. When partners engage in communicative 
action (as distinguished from strategic action), they must make a number of 
commitments in order to avoid unintelligibility. Minimally, speakers commit to 
justifying their positions to others. And to do so without contradiction, they 
are required to approach their interlocutors as rational beings, capable of 
understanding and responding to reasons.7 In Hegelian terms, there is a 
moment of recognition by which participants confer the status of rationality 
upon their partners in communication.8 In a more robust sense, the 
assumptions that govern communication constrain what qualifies as a rational 
form of dialogue. As Habermas argues, a fully rational consensus would be the 
result of an open-ended dialogue in which a) all affected parties have the right 
to participate; b) any participant can enter questions and topics; c) the 
conclusions of the conversation can be reinterrogated at any moment; and d) 
the form, language, or terms of evaluation can also be challenged by the 
participants.9  
For democratic theorists, Habermas’ account of communication yields 
some significant insights. Minimally, it is through the public activity of giving 
reasons and responding to the reasons of others that participants experience 
a reflexive moment of value refinement. On this epistemic reading, successful 
positions are not brute preferences, to be aggregated and pursued no matter 
their claim to rational validity. Rather, the back-and-forth of communication 
forces speakers to account for competing standpoints and thus shapes what 
sorts of commitments can reasonably be endorsed in a contested social field. 
By submitting positions to others and encountering challenges, participants 
engage in an intersubjective learning process that preserves the pluralism of 
late modern societies while minimizing their more invidious dynamics.10 It is 
for this reason that Habermas describes a deliberative politics as a source of 
solidarity under conditions of social difference. As he puts this point, “the 
communicative mastery of these conflicts constitutes the sole source of 
solidarity among strangers—strangers who renounce violence and, in the 
cooperative regulation of their common life, also concede one another the 
right to remain strangers.”11 In a stronger sense, these meditations on 
communicative action provide what Habermas takes to be a criterion for 
democratic legitimacy. Although no empirical speech community may ever 
fully actualize the conditions of an ideal speech situation, the pragmatic 
conditions of communication offer a procedural guide for generating a 
rational consensus, rather than settling for a modus vivendi or a moment of 
communicative exhaustion. More importantly, this normative ideal is already 
at work in the everyday life of speech communities and is not a utopian fiction, 
subject to the usual objections from materialist critics. It is, in other words, 
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both immanent to this historical form of life, and a transcendent standard by 
which the lifeworld could be evaluated.12   
The ambitions of Habermas' project have been met with equally strong 
objections over the resources (whether historical or normative)13 that are 
buried by this strong push toward a political rationality of consensus.14 What 
is most relevant for current purposes is Rancière’s contention that Habermas 
has not sufficiently theorized a) the scene of language in which his deliberative 
model is rooted, or b) the features of language that contribute most fully to 
democratic potentials. In Rancière’s own terms, “an a priori presumption of 
speech, shared by all subjects, is unsustainable: "this 'common' capacity is split 
up from the very beginning.... There is politics because speaking is not the 
same as speaking... It is a conflict about who speaks and who does not speak, 
about what has to be heard as the voice of pain and what has to be heard as 
an argument on justice."15 These challenges take a number of distinct forms, 
so it will be necessary to move in steps in order to unpack their scope and 
ramifications.  
Any such reconstruction must begin with the scene of speech that 
undergirds Habermas’ vision for critical theory. Where Habermas persistently 
invokes everyday linguistic exchange for his model of communicative reason, 
Rancière details how any cognitivist approach to communication must be 
thickened according to the forms of power that structure discursive practice. 
Minimally, it is inadequate to describe speech as an exchange between 
“preconstituted” language users. The status of speaker is not something that 
participants in communication “must” extend if they are to avoid an important 
contradiction; and neither is it a natural or metaphysical capacity that 
distinguishes the human as a uniquely political animal.16 Instead, to count as 
a speaking subject reflects broader social dynamics: those economies of 
power and esteem that condition who is (or is not) considered a bearer of full 
speech within the sphere of citizenship. Societies, from Rancière’s perspective, 
reflect an “immemorial and perennial wrong”: 
  [T]here is the symbolic distribution of bodies that divides them into 
two categories: those that one sees and those that one does not see, 
those who have a logos—memorial speech, an account to be kept 
up—and those who have no logos, those who really speak and those 
whose voice merely mimics the articulate voice to express pleasure 
and pain.17  
A theory concerned with discursive equality, then, must begin by treating 
access to speech as an essentially social question. Broadly, the authority of 
speech is conditioned by the “account” (le compte) made of it—that is, those 
social regimes of perception (the “partition of the perceptible”18) that allot 
normative weight differentially on the basis of who is speaking, in which 
settings, and on which topics.19 To be a speaker (in the emphatic sense) is not 
simply to have mastered the phonetic and lexical capacities for intelligible 
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utterances; further, it is to have meaningful access to relevant forums of will-
formation, to speak in socially approved idioms, and to be taken seriously in 
the questions or claims one poses. And, conversely, a bearer of “noise” is not 
simply the one silenced or blocked from participating in the conversations of 
a given community. More commonly, these agents show up in forums of civic 
speech to present their interests, anger or indignation, and yet their words are 
sapped of authority by hierarchical patterns of social worth.20 In Rancière’s 
evocative terms, these disqualified agents offer only the “the animal noise of 
voices expressing pleasure or pain.”21 As noise, these expressions do not 
possess the binding power of reason (or what is recognized as such) and thus 
do not matter in ways that command response or repair. 
It is for this reason that Rancière builds his rejoinder from a series of cases 
that have historically distinguished those with access to full speech and those 
without.22 For instance: the ancient polis, where only the property-owning, 
native-born male possessed the speech of citizenship—as counterposed to 
the slave, the one who is an instrument of another, and thus considered 
incapable of the logos; the woman, whose putative emotionality equips her 
for care labor in the domestic sphere, but disqualifies her for the dispassionate 
calculations of civic life; or, the colonized subject, whose native speech is 
mocked as the howling of animals or children (to be replaced by an imposed 
language of “civilization”). What binds these disparate cases is that they are 
subjects who offer their needs, challenges, and wants in speech 
communities—but whose words are dismissed, mocked, or set aside; no 
matter their facility with language, the values they invoke, or the warrants they 
provide for their claims. In Rancière’s peculiar idiolect, these are bearers of 
compromised speech, examples of “the part of no part” (la part des sans-part). 
Even when such agents enter the debates of civil society, they do not possess 
the authority to claim public attention. By extension, their words do not 
reverberate in the civic imagination or trouble the halls of power.23 
In philosophical terms, the tension detailed thus far reflects competing 
approaches to the normative term of universality. As readers of Habermas will 
know, his appeal to discursive validity is not simply based upon a procedural 
specification of conditions through which social conversations would give rise 
to a non-coerced consensus. Rather, the strong claim to rationality rests upon 
a demand for discursive universalization. In a particularly clear formulation, 
Habermas proposes “Only those norms can claim to be valid that meet (or 
could meet) with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants 
within a rational discourse.”24 In a word, the force of legitimacy stems from a 
Kantian rendering of universality, translated into intersubjective-dialogical 
terms.25 To meet the bar of communicative reason is to secure the potential 
assent of all parties—so long as debate on the salient issue is conducted under 
conditions that would make its conclusions rationally defensible.   
At a preliminary level, then, Rancière’s challenge to Habermas could be 
rendered through left-Hegelian critical terms: that no instantiation of the 
3 6  |  E x c e s s  W o r d s ,  S u r p l u s  N a m e s  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVII, No 2 (2019)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2019.889 
universal remains uncontaminated by particularity. Put brutely, norms are 
actualized in terms that are necessarily partial, limited, and incomplete, which 
means that each is haunted by the traces of its unredeemed possibilities.26 In 
Hegelian logic, this discrepancy yields the “unrest” of the concept—the 
unsustainability of its particular shapes and the impetus to develop in such a 
way as to actualize further potentials of the ideal at stake.27 As Rancière 
translates this principle into more recognizably political terms, “in human 
relations, heretofore, universalism has always been particularized.”28 If there is 
anything like an apodictic moment in Rancière, it is this: every shape of 
inclusion rests upon the refusal or bracketing of those contents that cannot 
(or will not) be accommodated. Or, in terms that reflect present concerns, 
every community is defined by a symbolic articulation (in Rancière’s terms, the 
“police”) that allots full speech to some and withholds it from others.29  The 
speech of hegemonic subjects attains to the logos and a heightened authority 
within the social economy of speech. These are speakers whose words 
demand consideration and response. Those who have “no part,” on the other 
hand, access speech insofar as they submit to the orders they receive. What 
they produce is noise—an indicator of mere preferences or wants, lacking the 
force of reason, commanding no recognition.  
3. 
As detailed to this point, Rancière’s challenge is straightforward: 
Habermas has idealized (or effaced) the social conditions for communication, 
thus obscuring the power of the symbolic economy that differentially 
authorizes (or deauthorizes) speakers in civil society. The normative stakes of 
this critique come clearer, however, in shifting from diagnostic to praxical 
considerations. On this point, Rancière proposes that the deliberative 
approach fails to account for the most significant dispute in a dialogical 
politics: “The problem is knowing whether the subjects who count in the 
interlocution ‘are’ or ‘are not,’ whether they are speaking or just making a 
noise. . . . The quarrel has nothing to do with more or less transparent or 
opaque linguistic contents; it has to do with consideration of speaking beings as 
such.” 30 Upon deepening the scope of conflict beyond claims, their meanings, 
or their justifications, the guiding question must be reformulated to ask what 
sort of politics is called for when the fundamental dispute is over the status of 
speakers themselves—who can count as a speaking subject and who cannot 
(or who counts only in partial or attenuated forms).  
To render this challenge along the lines of an ideal vs. a non-ideal 
approach to discourse would be inadequate. Such a reading fails to recognize 
that Habermas routinely allows that the practice of speech cannot be confused 
with the “idealizing presuppositions” of the ideal speech situation. As he 
concedes, civic speech is persistently short-circuited by ideological structures 
of knowledge or the withdrawal of topics from democratic scrutiny, and citizen 
interests are regularly supplanted by technocratic decision structures that 
erase fundamental questions of value.31 Even when the conversations of civil 
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society succeed in reaching consensus, such conclusions may have difficulty 
finding purchase in the distant, bureaucratized structures of the state (itself 
often captured by other actors and interests).32 Furthermore, Habermas’ later 
writings clarify that the empirical practice of civil society has rarely been so 
accommodating as his early references to a public sphere might suggest. As 
critics have pressed, it is unsustainable to refer to any single public sphere in 
the historical sense, as these sites of will-formation, interest, and opinion are 
best construed in the plural. The discursive world of citizenship is ultimately 
an overlapping set of publics and counter-publics, where minoritarian 
discourses seek to intervene within hegemonic debates and narratives.33 This 
point increasingly informs Habermas’ later work, which is more prone to 
theorize “segmented public spheres” that approach the aims of universality 
only insofar as previously excluded groups (and the discourses forged in these 
experiences of marginality) come to enter the conversations of citizenship.34   
In many ways, this diffraction of civil society resonates with Rancière’s 
critical intuitions—more specifically, his insistence that communities are 
structured by the divide between the authoritative speech of hegemonic 
groups and those subordinate populations who “have no speech to be 
heard.”35 Accordingly, politics (in the emphatic sense) is located in the 
movement where radical agents assume their equality and enter economies 
of speech in which they previously had no place. In Rancière’s own terms, 
“political activity . . . makes visible what had no business being seen, and makes 
heard a discourse where once there was only place for noise.”36 That said, this 
form of politics cannot be reduced to the abstract “entry” of groups upon a 
discursive stage that stretches to become more inclusive and accommodating. 
To recognize his distance from this more robust vision of deliberative politics, 
it is necessary to examine how such an entry is enacted—and, moreover, what 
this egalitarian movement means for the groups in question and the 
communicative space it unsettles.  
Most prominently, Rancière calls attention to the “subjectification” that 
defines political agency: “politics is a matter of subjects or, rather, modes of 
subjectification. By subjectification I mean the production through a series of 
actions of a body and a capacity for enunciation not previously identifiable 
within a given field of experience, whose identification is thus part of the 
reconfiguration of the field of experience.”37 Minimally, this passage highlights 
a point from the history of emancipatory politics. The discursive scene is rarely 
(if ever) expanded through the good will of hegemonic groups; it is instead 
broken open through the efforts of marginal actors. In Rancière’s terms, 
“politics exists when the natural order of domination is interrupted by the 
institution of a part of those who have no part.”38 It is not enough, then, to ask 
into how speech could be better distributed (in standard liberal terms), as such 
a question places the subject of politics into a position of passivity, a recipient 
of goods allotted by others.39 As Rancière argues, such a rendering would 
falsify the history of democratic agency, where the excluded force themselves 
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into the debates of citizenship—a break into a sphere that had, to this point, 
constituted itself through the bracketing of these voices.40   Through politics 
(in the strict sense), the previously “uncounted” make themselves count. They 
stage interventions into civic space; they interrupt the regular rhythms of the 
community; they act as if they were equal to their social “betters,” enacting the 
same rights and privileges; and they demand response from those who have 
never been required to answer to these insubordinate actors.41 It is this rupture 
that enacts the work of democratic agency: “to give a name to the anonymous 
and to make words audible where only noise was perceptible before.”42 
To privilege this dynamic may seem to rehash a core deliberative 
commitment: that civil society more fully approximates a democratic public 
insofar as more groups offer their challenges, needs, and questions within 
public conversations over shared institutions and norms.  The radicality of 
Rancière’s position comes clearer, however, with one further insistence: the 
subjects of politics do not possess a fixed social meaning that moves from 
margin to center.43  Rather, by assuming new powers and privileges, these 
agents take on an identity unprepared by what Rancière terms a ‘policed’ 
system of social meaning – that is, a system that assigns to members a 
circumscribed role within the civic imagination, along with the capacities and 
privileges deemed ‘natural’ to that placement.44 In his own terms, “any 
subjectification is a disidentification, removal from the naturalness of a place, 
the opening up of a subject space where anyone can be counted since it is the 
space where those of no account are counted.”45  To mitigate the vagueness 
of this formulation, it will be helpful to read it against some familiar political 
alternatives.  Minimally, Rancière proposes that the subjects of politics are not 
defined by pre-political experiences or identities that come to be recognized 
by others in the public sphere.  As he insists, these actors rather undergo a 
dis-identification when they enact an equality they did not previously ‘possess’ 
within dynamics of subordination.  Political action thus possesses a 
fundamentally generative element: radical agents become subjects in the first 
place by acting in excess of their ‘proper’ place – laying claim to rights and 
values that have historically been inaccessible from that position.46 As 
Benjamin Arditi describes the argument: “subjectivization involves this double 
move of decoupling oneself from what one is supposed to be and of practicing 
what you want to become. It does not describe a position but an interstitial 
region of movement:”47 Through this movement, political actors do something 
more than acquire a new social meaning; instead, they reconfigure the 
topography of who can speak authoritatively, on which issues, in relation to 
which binding values. It is in this way that political activity “inscribes a subject 
name as being different from any identified part of the community.”48   
This line of argument leads to many of the characteristic frustrations with 
Rancière’s thought. For instance, does the persistent emphasis on novelty 
undersell the experience of marginal groups, for whom these interests and 
claims would be long familiar?49 Does the hyperbolic rhetoric of insurgence 
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acknowledge the historical sedimentations of power that must be addressed 
for these interventions to serve meaningful social change?50 There is now an 
established literature on these reservations, that is complicated by Rancière's 
insistence that he does not reduce politics to exceptional and vanishing 
moments of uprising. Given the interests of this essay, however, the remainder 
will set aside these questions (as well as those who would defend him on these 
counts51) to pursue his deeper tension with deliberative theory—more 
specifically, how discursive resources can facilitate a democratic vision of 
politics. Here, the critical question must be recast from the usual terms (i.e., 
the brute gain or loss of speech), so as to ask how marginal subjects use civic 
languages in order to destabilize the space of citizenship and the identities 
that structure its economy of participation. The final section will thus engage 
how both theorists construe the normative possibilities of language in order 
to pose some broader lessons for democratic theory. At stake is not simply 
who possesses the full speech of citizenship, but rather the linguistic resources 
that permit this economy of speech to be remade in more egalitarian fashion. 
4. 
There are many ways to address this question. Deliberative theory offers 
a familiar rendering of discourse as a means for social coordination: it is 
through communication that subjects forge or restore consensus over the 
structures of the world. Citizens submit “criticizable validity claims” on topics 
of common concern, consider rejoinders or alternate standpoints, and 
reevaluate their commitments toward greater rational defensibility. In 
formulaic terms: language (for purposes of a rational politics) is a medium of 
understanding, guided by “the unforced force of the better argument.”52 For 
Rancière, it is not only that the deliberative approach glosses over the 
intractable dynamics of power; so too does it thin out the agentic possibilities 
of speech and the linguistic reserves that render such agency possible.53 In 
response, Rancière highlights a dimension of language that he terms 
“literarity.” As he explains, “the modern political animal is first a literary animal, 
caught in the circuit of a literariness that undoes the relationship between the 
order of words and the order of bodies that determine the place of each.”54 
Or, put differently, “humans are political animals because they are literary 
animals: not only in the Aristotelian sense of using language in order to discuss 
questions of justice, but also because we are confounded by the excess of 
words in relation to things.”55 
To render this move in more legibly political terms, it is useful to press 
what the “excess of words” amounts to and what distinguishes this excess from 
the “noise” of disqualified social groups. At times, the argument reflects the 
approach to agency detailed above: the insubordinate subject who demands 
to be heard, even when she or he is not recognized as a proper speaker in the 
official times and places of politics. Such an excess is “that of a living person 
who speaks too much, who speaks incorrectly, out of place and outside of the 
truth.”56 A less obvious form of excess, however, is located within the 
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pragmatics of language itself—what it permits agents to do in in order to 
“mak[e] what was unseen visible” or “mak[e] what was audible as mere noise 
heard as speech.”57  
This broad gesture gains substance by attending to the history of 
emancipatory politics. For instance, the success of political movements has 
often hinged upon requalifying practices and spaces so that they are perceived 
as amenable to justice considerations (when they did not previously enjoy this 
status).58 In this connection, think of ongoing efforts to divert the discourse of 
financial debt away from private arrangements governed by market norms, 
and instead into the register of power, class predation, and the state. Such a 
rhetorical shift aims to undo the spurious depoliticization of market 
mechanisms so that they are seen differently within the space of citizenship—
as political institutions, entangled with (and enabled by) state policies, and 
thus subject to democratic oversight and constraints. This polemical work of 
redescription renders possible not only new perceptions, but new possibilities 
to contest the financialization of social practice. To continue the thread of the 
previous section, however, Rancière contends that the excess of words enables 
groups to “mak[e] themselves seen or heard as speaking subjects” by 
complicating the established taxonomy of social roles.59 To illustrate, take two 
examples that appear repeatedly in Rancière’s work: a) the invocation, within 
the demonstrations of May ’68, that “we are all German Jews” (offered by a 
crowd largely composed of French Catholics); or b) the trial of August Blanqui, 
in which the defendant insists to a puzzled magistrate that the proper name 
for his profession is that of “proletarian.” While these instances may seem to 
have little in common, they point to civic language as a site through which 
insurgent agents “transform identities defined in the natural order . . . into 
instances of experience of a dispute.”60 In each case, Rancière is interested in 
how speech does something more than pose questions, petition 
representatives, or present interests. Instead, these are moments where agents 
reinvest the civic vocabulary in order to loosen or transform its structuring 
categories. For instance, when Blanqui insists that proletarian is his 
“profession,” he displaces the significance of this term from a) a sociological 
category (i.e., profession as employment), to b) a place of enunciation for 
those who identify in common (i.e., a declaration of having-been-wronged by 
class society).61 This sort of profession is less a category of labor, imposed by 
the economic order, and more a site for the articulation of a grievance. And 
by extension, the normative meaning of the proletarian is likewise displaced—
from the “universal victim” of an expropriative economic apparatus (along with 
a moralist framework of pity) to a source of justice claims, open to all wronged 
by class society.62 To enact this shift is to go beyond an abstract disruption of 
meaning, so as to permit new connections and alliances among those who 
identify with this expanded field of wrong. 
This approach to language as a site of counter-hegemonic solidarity 
resonates with some familiar instances of political mobilization. Take, for 
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instance, the phrases “we the people” or “we the ninety-nine percent” by which 
collectives announce themselves on the public stage. As Rancière argues, such 
phrases do not name a preexistent given that simply awaits its appropriate 
name, but rather does something in the act of its articulation.63 To offer this 
“we” in the appropriate conditions is to create a new site around which diffuse 
political energies could coalesce into something approximating a collective 
subject, speaking and acting in common. In Rancière’s own terms, “The ‘we’ is 
not the expression of an identity; it is an act of enunciation which creates the 
subject that it names.”64 Where this formulation might evoke some now-
standard reservations toward performative models of political action (i.e., an 
approach that fails to account for the material circumstances and constraints 
of power65), a more nuanced reading would attend to Rancière’s insistence 
that “a mode of subjectification does not create subjects ex nihilo; it creates 
them by transforming identities defined in the natural order of the allocation 
of functions and places into instances of experience of a dispute.”66 Or, to 
invoke the terms that he increasingly comes to use, the emergence of new 
subjects reflects a transformative work upon the “political names” that orient 
civic space.  
Minimally, this phrase highlights the linguistic categories that allot agents 
a legible place within the civic imagination (along with the treatments and 
evaluations that attend this role). But the more interesting question stems 
from how such categories offer purchase for a politics that destabilizes the 
accepted order of entitlements and powers. For instance, as Rancière engages 
Hannah Arendt, he argues “man and citizen do not designate collections of 
individuals. Man and citizen are political subjects and as such are not definite 
collectivities, but surplus names that set out a question or a dispute about who 
is included in their count.”67 This theme of names—surplus names or excess 
names—turns up repeatedly in Rancière’s thought.68 At bottom, the term 
reflects a core intuition: the social categories embedded within the language 
of citizenship are not neutral, sociological classifications, but rather lend 
normative meaning to these groupings and organize the social distribution of 
privileges, burdens, and benefits. These categories delineate who belongs 
where, who merits the protections of institutions, who is authorized to engage 
in the ordering of communal life, and who, conversely, is to “stay silent and 
submit.”69 Further yet, the lived work of these names is to naturalize such 
distinctions within the everyday regime of “common sense.” Where this 
description may suggest a closed set of social assignments, political history 
reveals that such names likewise offer praxical openings on the most 
fundamental question: who is (or can be) “included in their count.”70 Take the 
examples from the cited passage: to be a “human,” “man,” or a “citizen” is not 
a settled status that irrevocably delineates those within and those without 
these privileged categories. Rather, such names are persistently appealed by 
those left outside their count, so as to become the object of struggle for those 
who do not qualify or qualify in only an attenuated sense (e.g., the demand to 
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be recognized as human—and thus protected as such—issued by populations 
abandoned to state violence).71  
To put Rancière’s point more broadly, dispossessed groups are not solely 
ordered (in a passive sense) by the current set of civic names. Instead, such 
assignments are routinely contested by a politics that roots itself within these 
categories so as to exploit their ambiguities, inconsistencies, or applications. 
For instance, movements of equality have long juxtaposed various civic names 
to lay bare how even the most (ostensibly) universal normative goods are 
distributed in an exclusionary or inequitable fashion. As Rancière details this 
trajectory of left politics, “the various forms of ‘us’ have . . . put the inscription 
of equality to the test, to ask if human rights, the rights of man, were more or 
less than the rights of the citizen, if they were those of woman, of the 
proletarian, of the black man, of the black woman, and so on.”72 In this sense, 
a politics of the name exposes the normative hierarchies that rest below 
official narratives of inclusion and equality. And such strategies take a more 
constructive form when radical agents claim membership in the name that has 
refused them, thereby transforming the category as it is redeployed in new 
situations, over new bodies and lives (e.g., efforts by sexual minorities to claim 
the names of partnership associated with straight attachment; or, efforts by 
sexual performers to gain the name of sex workers).73 To employ Rancière’s 
own terms, these names are fundamentally “conflictual.”74 By taking these 
names as their own, emergent subjects do not only disturb the regime of 
meaning that has, to this point, naturalized a hierarchical social space; further 
yet, they use these names to seize an expanded set of powers and privileges 
(e.g., voting, the right to work, access to civic spaces). 
A politics of “literarity” thus reflects the ambiguity of the political name—
its ambivalent tie to legibility, subordination, and agency. Rancière illustrates 
this point through the case of Olympia de Gouges, who argued in 
revolutionary France that “if women are entitled to go to the scaffold, they are 
entitled to go to the assembly”; here, playing on the civic status of women, 
both included and excluded from the life of the state.75 More specifically, the 
name of woman is invoked in what Rancière terms the form of dispute. A 
diminished capacity to participate in the polity (i.e., the historico-empirical 
practice of this name) is counterposed to the absolute claim that the state 
nevertheless makes to the lives of women—and this again counterposed to 
the universal normative status that women are owed as human beings. Each 
of these senses a) puts the meaning of “woman” back into play as a contested 
operator for civic or moral rights, and b) reveals how this name overlaps and 
jostles with other names that this subject can claim as their own (each with its 
own entitlements, burdens, or privileges).76 Or, in contemporary terms, the 
point could be illustrated through a recurring trope of prison activism in the 
contemporary United States. Where the carceral state is often defined by the 
sheer number of bodies confined by the state at any given time, it has likewise 
unleashed a set of correlative penalties, abridging the rights of incarcerated 
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persons long after their release from prison. Accordingly, much prison activism 
stakes itself upon this categorial tension in the social imagination, between 
the criminal and the citizen. As one prisoner, facing disenfranchisement 
penalties upon his release, details, “I will pay taxes but I won’t be able to vote. 
. . . It lets me know that I’m not truly a citizen . . . I will have no say in the 
political process or the direction of the nation.”77 Here, the appeal to 
citizenship plays upon the tensions surrounding this term within the history of 
the United States: the full contributor who pays their share as set against the 
one with the right to participate in collective decision making.78 By invoking 
this name, the prisoner invokes the torsion of citizenship as simultaneously a 
term of empowerment and dispossession—and thus to highlight the civic 
violence within the regime of mass incarceration.  
At bottom, then, Rancière’s concern for the “excess” of words challenges 
the thinness of deliberative efforts to delimit and rationalize the appropriate 
bounds of political language. The history of emancipatory politics reveals that 
speech is not only a resource to arrive at mutual understanding, justification 
through public reasons, or “the simple rationality of a dialogue of interests.”79 
Instead, radical actors seize, problematize, and reoccupy the linguistic markers 
of political identity in order to destabilize the familiar moorings of civic life. It 
is for this reason that Rancière highlights the name as something more than a 
possibility for nomination or classification; rather, it is a site of political 
litigation. As he puts this point, “political names are litigious names, whose 
extension and comprehension are uncertain, and which for that reason open 
up the space of a test or verification. Political subjects build such cases of 
verification. They put the power of political names—that is, their extension and 
comprehension—to the test. Not only do they bring the inscription of rights 
to bear against situations in which those rights are denied but they construct 
the world in which those rights are valid, together with the world in which they 
are not.”80 Accordingly, this vision of discourse is more robust than a medium 
to convey interests or negotiate values. Rather, it is a site to destabilize the 
assigned order of identities, along with the rights and entitlements that follow. 
When such agents assume an equality beyond their assigned categories (and 
the normative expectations that follow), they become something that is not 
prepared by the present coordinates for social legibility. And in contesting or 
claiming these names, such actors ultimately gain new purchase on the space 
of citizenship. 
5. 
To bring the foregoing to a head, there is much that Habermas and 
Rancière share as they develop a politics of speech. Both pin their normative 
visions upon a broadened economy of discourse, incorporating new speakers 
and new objects for scrutiny. And each targets the reduction of political 
discourse as a fundamental obstacle to the possibility of democratic life. And 
yet, perhaps the clearest way to preserve their tension is through the 
dimension of language that each considers central to politics. Habermas 
4 4  |  E x c e s s  W o r d s ,  S u r p l u s  N a m e s  
Journal of French and Francophone Philosophy  |  Revue de la philosophie française et de langue française 
Vol XXVII, No 2 (2019)  |  http://www.jffp.org  | DOI 10.5195/jffp.2019.889 
stresses a non-instrumental form of communication toward understanding 
between recognized speakers—a stance that reflects what he takes to be one 
of the central normative tasks of late modernity: to arrive at resources for 
rational justification, even under conditions of value pluralism, market 
expansion, and social division. Rancière, on the other hand, stresses a different 
question, founded within the impetus of democratic life: how to secure a more 
equal access to speech when this status is diminished or blocked by social 
economies of power.  
As detailed above, there are substantive outcomes to shifting the 
question in this manner. In “litigating” civic languages, radical agents become 
something more than objects of social discourse; instead, they disturb 
categories of civic perception (for people, spaces, and things), along with the 
normative status such classifications carry. These possibilities for agency rest 
upon a deeper thesis regarding the “excess” of words—more specifically, their 
resources beyond the hegemonic renderings of classifications, values, and 
names.81 What this means is that a politics of equality has historically drawn 
from linguistic resources and performances that are routinely neglected from 
a deliberative perspective. Speech is not reducible to a medium for clarifying 
commitments, presenting claims, posing questions, conveying information, or 
presenting orders—all of which reflect what Rancière terms “the fairy tale 
which clothes the debating of common interests in the garb of philosophical 
dialogue.”82 Rather, civic languages possess tensions and ambiguities that are 
exploited in order to destabilize the perceptual regime of civic life along with 
its possibilities for belonging and participation.  
From this point, it is tempting to conclude that Rancière simply roots 
politics within those aesthetic practices that “disrupt” language in order to 
enact new possibilities of thought and experience—a reading that would only 
seem to be confirmed by his insistence upon a foundational link between 
politics and aesthetics.83 If the argument were reducible to these terms, it 
could easily be domesticated through Habermas’ typical rejoinder: such an 
“aestheticist” move would ultimately level the distinctions between discursive 
modes (each with its own governing logic and conditions for validity) and thus 
bury the specificities of political discourse.84 This rendering, however, would 
miss both the contours and the stakes of the dispute. To link political agency 
to these generative elements of language is not to absorb multiple discursive 
forms (or the search for rational consensus) into “the world-disclosing force of 
innovative linguistic expression.”85 Instead, the rejoinder is more accurately 
approached as an imminent critique of the deliberative project: these irruptive 
entries into the space of communication are necessary for the very aims that 
the deliberative ideal avows.86 The model of uncoerced exchange between 
free and equal speaking subjects is not embedded within the ostensible 
necessities of language, communication, or rationality. Nor can it be folded 
into the acts of recognition performed by individual communicants, regardless 
of the symbolic economy that structures the space of their encounter. Instead, 
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“the equality of any speaking being with any other speaking being” can be 
gained only through political efforts to reconfigure the civic field.87 And one 
of the core axes for doing so is through the repurposing and reinvestment of 
civic languages. 
Ultimately, then, there are much wider implications to this dispute over 
the production and exchange of civic speech. For Rancière, it is not simply that 
Habermas misses the intractable dynamics of dispossession at work in the 
communicative scene. In a normatively richer sense, his challenge targets the 
deliberative approach as inadequate to deliver on the democratic values it 
persistently invokes. If consensual adjudication reflects a core element of 
democratic legitimacy, what is too often left unasked by the deliberative 
approach is the political question that animates the democratic tradition—
how dynamics of power, hierarchy, and dispossession are (or can be) 
contested in order to secure a greater equality of speech. And this critical 
rejoinder can be put in positive terms. If a democratic regime of speech is to 
be possible, it is not based within the transcendental structures of 
communication or the exchange of reasons on the part of recognized 
speakers. Rather, a practice of equality is rooted in the capacity of agents to 
use the ambiguities and slippages of civic languages to make themselves 
count within economies of speech, even when they possess no “title” to do 
so.88  
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